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ACCESS TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FACILITIES FOR RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION BY STUDENTS, STUDENT GROUPS AND
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS:
EXTENDING THE REACH OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
Ralph D. Mawdsley, ].D., Ph.D.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Until Congress' passage of the Equal Access Act (EAA) 1 in 1984 and
the Supreme Court's later decision in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, 2 public school districts had few constraints on
prohibiting religious expression in their schools. In the EAA, Congress
took the first step toward opening public schools to religious expression
by creating a limited open forum in schools where non-curriculumrelated student groups were permitted to meet during non-instructional
time. 3 In creating a statutory right of expression, Congress, in effect,
reversed two earlier federal circuit decisions that had denied a
constitutional right of expression. 4 The Supreme Court's upholding of
the constitutionality of the EAA in 1990 against a strong Establishment
Clause challenge 3 presaged the Court's unanimous decision 6 three years
later in Lamb's Chapel, which recognized that constitutional rights of free

' Prof. of Educ. Administration, Cleveland St. U., Cleveland, Ohio; ).D., U. of III.; Ph.D., U. of Minn.
I. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988). The EAA provides that once a secondary school has created a
"limited open forum," the school must permit all "noncurriculum related student groups" to meet
"during non instructional time" regardless of the groups' "religious, political, philosophical, or other
speech content." /d.
2. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. 508 U.S. 384 (1993) [hereinafter
Lamb's Chapel].
3. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988).
4. See Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of Guilderland C. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that the Establishment Clause trumped the free exercise and free speech rights of student
religious groups to meet on school premises); Lubbock Civ. Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch.
Dist., 669 f'.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
5. Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
6. While all justices concurred in the judgment, two separate concurring opinions were also
gener<lted involving three justices.
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speech expression applied to the K-12leveF
Although Lamb's Chapel dealt with the expressive rights of a
community organization (an evangelical church) as opposed to
individual students or student groups,R the ice of resistance to religious
activity in public schools had been broken. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court
unanimously held that once a school district had permitted a nonreligious viewpoint on the subject of child rearing on its premises, it
could not discriminate against a church's presentation of a religious
viewpoint on the same subject. 9
By prohibiting viewpoint
discrimination, the Court created a constitutional floor of protection for
religious expression. In the decade since Lamb's Chapel, the pressure on
school boards from religious claimants to treat all religious expression
the same as non-religious expression has been unrelenting. The purpose
of this article is to examine how courts, in their more recent decisions,
have addressed the religious speech claims of individual students, student
groups, and community organizations.
II. THE RANGE OF RELIGIOUS CLAIMS BEFORE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Both individuals and groups can make religious claims on public
schools. Individual claims by students can involve a wide range of issues,
such as religious meetings during non-instructional time, 10 wearing
religious clothing or symbols, 11 making speeches, 12 or distributing

7. Lambs Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97. Twelve years prior to Lamb's Chapel, the Courl, in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), held that a state university that made its facilities generally
available to registered student groups could not deny the use of its facilities (vacant classrooms and
the student union) to a student religious group. The Court held that a limited open forum "docs not
confer any imprimatur of state approval" on a religious group for purposes of the Establishment
Clause, and refusal to recognize a religious group based on the content of its message is a violation of
free speech. Id. at 274. The fact that twelve years had to intervene before free speech was applied to
religious speech at the K-12 level reflects the tenacity of the judicial mindset that religion could be
treated differently at the K-12level.
8. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that a church could
show a six-part film series from Dr. james Dobson that approached child rearing from a Christian
perspective during after-school hours at a high school, based on its finding that the school board had
created a free speech limited public forum by permitting other perspectives of child rearing to be
presented on its facilities. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388 n. 3, 392 n. 5.
9. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97.
10. See e.g. Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 f.3d H7X (9tb Cir.
1997) (entitling students to meet for religious purposes during lunch).
11. See e.g. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding tbat Sikh student was
entitled to wear a religious ceremonial knife).
12. See e.g. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (tlnding that
a principal's denial of a valedictorian's use of religious proselytizing comments in his speech was not
a violation of free speech).

SCHOOL ACCESS FOR RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

269]

271

literature. 13
Students can make claims through their religious
organizations as well. Those claims most frequently involve meeting
space in school facilities, 14 availability of resources/ 5 and distribution of
religious materials. 1" Community religious organizations also make
demands of school officials, but their demands have been limited to
asking for meeting space on school premises 17 and requesting
distribution of religious materials. 18
Religious claims concerning public schools raise three legal issues.
These three issues represent the precarious balance between the Free
Speech (and, occasionally, the Free Exercise) Clause and the
Establishment Clause. First, what religious practices should be allowed
under free speech? Under Lamb's Chapel, a school that permits subject
matter expression from a non-religious perspective during non-school
hours cannot refuse a religious organization's viewpoint on the same
subject. ~
In other words, unless the school wants to prohibit all
expression on a particular subject, it is required by free speech to allow a
religious viewpoint where other viewpoints have been permitted. 20
Second, what religious practices are prohibited by the Establishment
Clause?
Some religious expression, such as school-organized or
sponsored prayer at graduations 21 or football games, 22 are not permissible
1

13. Sec e.g. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that an elementary student is not entitled to distribute candy canes with religious messages during
classroom activities).
14. See e.g. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
students are entitled to form a religious club under EAA and meet on school premises like other
student clubs).
15. See e.g. Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003)
(holding that a student religious club is entitled under free speech to the same resources available to
other student clubs).
16. Sec e.g. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass.
2003) (finding that students were entitled to distribute religious messages attached to candy canes).
17. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) [hereinafter Good News]
(holding that the school district was required to permit a religious community club to meet on
school premises immediately after school).
18. See C.E.F. v. Stafford Township Sch. Dist., 233 F. Supp. 2d 647 (D. N.j. 2002) (holding that
a religious community organization was entitled to distribute materials, post items on school walls,
and have table space at back-to-school-nights).
19. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97.
20. See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that
the publication of a student religious organization is entitled to funding on the same basis as other
publications from ditlering viewpoints).
21. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that school organized graduation
prayers violated the Establishment Clause).
22. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that student initiated
and student led prayer before football game violated the Establishment Clause).
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because, under the Establishment Clause's endorsementc 1 and
psychological coercion 24 tests, a school would be perceived as sponsoring
religion and coercing participation in a religious activity.
Third, what religious practices, even if not required under the free
speech clause, are permissible because they do not violate the
Establishment Clause? School graduations are controlled by school
boards and school officials and are, essentially, non-public fora.
However, school boards could choose to give control over the content of
graduation speeches to the students. To the extent that school officials
are willing to create what would be a limited public forum for student
speeches during an otherwise school-controlled graduation, case law
suggests that a student's speech with religious content might be
permissible. 25
III. COMMUNITY ACCESS TO SCHOOL PREMISES
In 2001, the Supreme Court followed up on Lamb's Chapel with
Good News Club v. Milford Central SchooZ.Z 6 Invoking the same New
York statute at issue in Lamb's Chapel, 27 the Milford School Board denied
the Good News Club, a private Christian club for children between the
ages of six and twelve, permission to hold meetings immediately after
school at an elementary school, even though other community groups,
such as the scouts and 4-H club, had been granted such permission. 2 x In
finding a free speech violation, a strongly divided Coure 9 held that the
23. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (articulating
her two-part endorsement test for the first time).
24. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577 (articulating for the first time Justice Kennedy's psychological
coercion test to invalidate graduation prayer).
25. Compare ]ones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding
school board resolution permitting high school volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, non-proselytizing
invocations at their graduation ceremonies) with ACLU v. Black Horse Reg/. Bd. o( Educ., 84 !'.3d
1471 (3d Cir. 1995) (enjoining school board from permitting prayer at graduation based on senior
votes on prayer or no prayer). See also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 !'.3d 832 (9th C:ir.
1998), decision withdrawn, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (Prior to withdrawal of its decision, the court
had upheld the school board's policy permitting four students with the highest GPAs to deliver a
graduation speech that could take the form of "an address, poem, reading, song, musical
presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement." Id. at 834.).
26. Good News, 533 U.S. at 98.
27. N.Y. Educ. L. § 414 (McKinney 2000) (This statute authorizes local school boards to adopt
reasonable regulations for the use of school property for ten specified purposes, including the
holding of "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to
the welfare of the community." In interpreting this law, the school districts in both Lamb's Chapel
and Good News prohibited the use of their school> for religious purposes.).
28. Good News, 533 U.S. at 136 (Souter & Ginsburg, )J., dissenting).
29. Although the vote was 6-3 to reverse the Second Circuit decision that had, in turn,
reversed the federal district court's granting of summary judgment to the school district, Justice
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school had violated the free expression rights of the Good News Club by
refusing it permission to meet. 30 The reasoning of the majority and
dissenting opinions in the case 31 mirror in a broader perspective the
fundamental differences among the Justices regarding the role of religion
in public education.
Justice Thomas, reflecting a religious accommodationist position,
found that once the school had allowed other groups addressing morals
and character development to use school facilities after school, "it [was]
quite clear that Milford engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it
excluded the [Good News] Club from the afterschool forum." 32 More
importantly, characterizing the Club as "quintessentially religious" or
"decidedly religious in nature" did not exclude it from free speech
protection. 13 The school district lacked an Establishment Clause defense
because "the Club's meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored
by the school, and open to any student who obtained parental
consent .... " 11 In interesting free speech dictum, the majority refused to
permit use of a Heckler's Veto type argument by those desirous of
restricting equal access simply because the youngest members of the
audience might perceive the Club's presence on school premises as
endorsement of religion. 35
Breyer\ concurring opinion was barely a vote with the majority. Justice Breyer essentially reversed
the court of appeals decision because the district court's summary judgment had been appealed and,
thus, no decision on the merits had yet been made. He found that sufficient evidence existed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether the c;ood News Club's presence at the school would
satisfy the Establishment Clause's endorsement test. ln other words, Justice Breyer voted with the
majority only on procedural grounds. Because five votes existed to decide the case on the merits,
(Justice Thomas, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy), one
cannot be certain how Justice Breyer would have voted if the case had been re-appealed to the Court
on the meril.'-..
30. Good News, 533 U.S. at 109.
31. Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. justice Scalia also tlled a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer tiled an
opinion concurring in part. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Souter, in which
Justice c;insburg joined.

32. Good News, 533 U.S. at 109.
33.

ld. at 111 .

.l4.

/d. at 113.

35. Jd. at 11H-19. The concept of the Heckler's Veto owes its origin to Tcnninicl/o v. City of
C!Ji. 337 U.S. 1 ( 1949), where the Court refused to limit the rights of expression in a public forum
because of the nature of opposition to the views expressed. See also Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory
lld. v. /'incite, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (In protecting the right of the KKK to display a cross on state property operated as a
public forum, Justice O'Connor observed that, "because our concern is with the political community
[at[ large ... the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving
isolated nonadherents from ... discomfort. . . . 1t is for this reason that the reasonable observer in
the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and
l<mnn in which the religious [speech takes place].").
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On the other hand, Justice Stevens, taking a religious separationist
position in his dissenting opinion, argued that a school district could
choose to allow student meetings that discuss topics from a religious
point of view while, at the same time, prohibiting meetings that engage in
"proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith." 36 This
latter kind of meeting, "designed to convert children to a particular
religious faith," he saw as "tend[ing] to separate young children into
cliques that undermine the school's educational mission." 37 Justice
Stevens' position was echoed in Justice Souter's dissent, where he opined
that because the Club was holding "an evangelical service or worship
calling children to commit themselves in an act of Christian
conversion," 3R access to school facilities was outside the school's limited
public forum.
Despite its decision for the religious club, the Good News majority
left three issues unresolved. First, the Supreme Court in Good News (and
Lamb's Chapel, as well) did not determine whether the school districts
had created limited public fora. In both cases, the parties had stipulated
the existence of a limited public forum, thus obviating the need for the
Court to determine whether one, in fact, had existed. 39 As a result, one is
left to speculate as to what the elements of a limited public forum might
be. One possibility is that the requirements for a free speech limited
public forum parallel those of an EAA limited open forum. The
reasoning would be that, just as even one non-curriculum-related club is
sufficient to invoke a limited open forum under the EAA, 40 so also would
even one non-religious viewpoint be sufficient to invoke free speech
protection for a religious viewpoint. 41 Although the Supreme Court has
yet to address the merits regarding the elements of a limited public forum
in a viewpoint discrimination case, several lower federal courts, as will be
seen below, have begun making connections between the EAA and free
speech:12
36. Good News, 533 U.S. at 130 (Stevens,)., dissenting).
37. !d. at 132.
38. Jd. at 138 (Souter,)., dissenting).
39. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-92; Good News, 533 U.S. at 106.
40. See e.g. East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp.
2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that a school board operated a limited open forum under EAA by
permitting non-curriculum related groups to meet, and therefore, the high school would have to
recognize the gay/lesbian group).
41. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391 n. 5 (identifying, for purposes of determining whether
a limited open forum had been created by the public school, only one speech by a psychologist on the
subject of human development); Good News, 533 U.S. at 108 (focusing on use of the premises by the
Boy Scouts for character and moral development).
42. Prince, 303 F.3d 1074 (discussed infra Part V); Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd.,
336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussed infra Part V).
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Second, can school boards prohibit groups that engage in religious
worship from using their facilities? The Court in Good News sidestepped
this question because, even though the Good News Club engaged in
activities that were "quintessentially religious," it also engaged in
instructive functions that were decidedly similar to those of the Boy
Scouts, a non-religious group permitted to meet on school premises. 43
The Good News Club was clearly not a church, temple or synagogue that
might engage in worship services proselytizing in nature, but since even
the most religious of organizations is likely to engage in activities that
have secular components, such as helping the poor, one wonders whether
it will be easy for courts to draw clear lines between religious and secular.
As a practical matter, one can query whether public school district
officials can, or should, engage in dissecting the religious and secular
functions of religious organizations to determine whether these
organizations may have access to school district property. 44
Third, is the Good News majority suggesting that the distinction
between viewpoints and subject matter in Lamb's Chapel has disappeared
or, at least, is less apparent? In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that once a
public school district has opened its premises to particular subject matter
(childrearing in Lamb's Chapel, and character and moral development in
Good News), the district cannot discriminate against a viewpoint on that
subject simply because it is religious. 45 In blunting the school district's
argument and the Court of Appeals reasoning in Good News that
viewpoint discrimination did not apply to "quintessentially religious"
uses, the Supreme Court came tantalizingly close to suggesting that every
viewpoint, even one involving proselytizing worship services, might be
protected under free speech. 46
43. Good News, 533 U.S. at 108. (In comparing the Good News Club to the Boy Scouts, the
Court observed that "no one disputes that the Club instructs children to overcome feelings of
jealousy, to treat others well regardless of how they treat the children, and to be obedient, even if it
does so in a nonsecular way.").
44. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Bronx II). (The Second Circuit noted that the federal district court, in granting
injunctive relief to a church permitting it to hold religious services in a public school building on
Sunday, had held that "the distinction between worship and other types of religious speech [is] one
that cannot meaningfully be drawn by the courts." Id. at 354. However, the appeals court, in
upholding the injunction, nonetheless "decline[ d] to review the trial court's ... determination
that ... the distinction between worship and other types of religious speech cannot meaningfully be
drawn by the courts." Id. at 354-55.).
45. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97.
46. Good News, 533 U.S. at Ill.
It is apparent that the unstated principle of the Court of Appeals' reasoning is its conclusion
that any time religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss morals and character, the
discussion is simply not a "pure" discussion of those issues. According to the Court of Appeals,
reliance on Christian principles taints moral and character instruction in a way that other
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Although the Good News majority never had to resolve this issue, one
can speculate that if every religious expression is entitled to free-speechviewpoint protection, then the reason for determining the subject matter
on which a viewpoint is based has ceased to exist. In essence, even
"religious worship could not be treated as an inherently distinct type of
activity. . . [and must be viewed as] comparable to other activities
involving ritual and ceremony, such as Boy and Girl Scout meetings." 47
In a recent post-Good News Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of City of New York,
(Bronx II) 48 the court, in reversing its earlier decision denying a church
access to public school premises for Sunday worship services, 49 cogently
reflected the viewpoint/subject matter dichotomy yet unanswered by the
Supreme Court:
Would we be able to identify a form of religious worship that is
divorced from the teaching of moral values? Should we continue to
evaluate activities that include religious worship on a case-by-case basis,
or should worship no longer be treated as a distinct category of speech?
How does the distinction drawn in our earlier precedent between
worship and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint relate to
the dichotomy suggested in Good News Club between "mere" worship
on the one hand and worship that is not divorced from the teaching of
moral values on the other? 50

IV. COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

School boards frequently permit community groups to distribute
brochures or fliers advertising their activities or programs to students in
schools, usually at the end of the day when students are leaving. 5 1 While
this distribution presents an inexpensive way for community
organizations to promote programs of interest to children, brochures
advertising religious programs invite Establishment Clause challenges.

foundations for thought or viewpoint do not.

We, however, have never reached such a

conclusion.

Id.
47. Bronx II, 331 F.3d at 353-54.
48. 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering the Good News decision to have reversed its
earlier decision treating worship services as a subject not protected by viewpoint discrimination).
49. Bronx Household of Faith v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 !'.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Bronx I] (upholding school district policy prohibiting use of its premises for religious
purposes as not being viewpoint discrimination because worship services were a subject different
from presentations from a religious perspective protected under Lamb's Chapel).
50. Bronx II, 331 F.3d at 355.
51. See e.g., Rusk v. Crestview Local Schs., 220 F. Supp. 2d 854, 855 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
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However, because the Supreme Court has not addressed the distribution
of religious materials, lower federal courts are left to apply Lamb's Chapel
and Good News as best they can.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hills v. Scottsdale Unified
School District, 52 addressed whether a school district that permitted nonprofit organizations to distribute literature through its schools could
prohibit distribution of a summer camp brochure that included, among
the nineteen courses offered, two classes on "Bible Heroes" and "Bible
Tales." 51 The school district's policy was to permit distribution of
literature that promoted events and activities of interest to students, but
not Hyers of a "commercial, political or religious nature." 54 In addition to
the Bible courses, the brochure contained the following language: "Did
you know that if a child does not come to the knowledge of JESUS
CHRIST and learn of the importance of Bible reading by the age 12
chances are slim that they ever will in this life? We think it is important
to start as young as possible!" 55
After initially permitting the brochure to be distributed, school
district officials stopped the distribution, and then allowed it to resume
with a disclaimer. 5" The district then changed course and refused to
permit distribution, even with the disclaimer, then permitted distribution
again with the disclaimer, and finally rescinded its permission to
distribute the brochure altogether.
School officials informed the
organizer of the camp that he could resubmit the brochure if he would
modify the brochure by "remov[ing] descriptions of the Bible classes,
chang[ing] the spelling of "Sonshine" to "Sunshine," omit[ting] graphics
of the Bible, cross and dove, and incorporate[ing] the disclaimer into the
brochure." 57
After electing not to modify the brochure, the camp organizer filed
suit, alleging violations of free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and
due process. 5x
Citing to both Lamb's Chapel and Good News, the Ninth Circuit, in
reversing the federal district court's summary judgment for the school
district, found that the district had created a limited public forum for free

52.

Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003).

53. !d. at 1047-4X.

54. !d. at 1047.
55. !d. at 1048.
56. !d. (The disclaimer language was: "The Scottsdale Unified School District neither endorses
nor sponsors the organization or activity represented in this document. The distribution of this
material is provided as a community service.).
57.

/d. at I 048.

5H.

!d.
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speech purposes. 59 The school, in this case, intentionally opened what
had been a nonpublic forum "to certain groups or topics," 60 and because
the forum created had "a broad purpose" of providing a "community
service"61 to notify students and parents of extra-curricular events, the
school district could not "refuse to distribute literature advertising an offcampus summer program because it is taught from a Christian
perspective." 62 As a result, "[i]f an organization proposes to advertise an
otherwise permissible type of extra-curricular event, it must be allowed to
do so, even if the event is obviously cast from a particular religious
viewpoint .... "63
The Hills court found no Establishment Clause problem because the
brochures were sent home to parents who would make decisions
regarding participation, and the distribution of the brochures at the end
of the school day took them outside the part of the day devoted to
"teacher's instruction and curriculum." 64
Thus, without an
Establishment Clause issue, the court was able to sidestep whether a
school district's prohibiting the use of its facilities for religious use under
the Establishment Clause constituted a compelling interest to offset a free
speech viewpoint discrimination claim. 65
In C.E.F. v. Stafford Township School District, 66 a federal district court
in New Jersey reached a result similar to Hills by ordering two
elementary schools 67 to permit Child Evangelism Fellowship (CEF), a
community religious organization, to hang brochures and posters on
school walls (but not on bulletin boards), to permit teachers to distribute
flyers and permission slips, and to permit the group access to tables at the
school's Back-to-School Night. 68 The court described the flyers as
"lighthearted in tone, emphasizing that children will learn 'biblical
principles, moral values, character qualities, [and] respect for authority'
through Bible lessons, missionary stories, singing, and other activities."" 9

59. Id.at 1048-49.
60. Id. at 1049.
61. Id. at 1051.
62. !d. at 1054.
63. !d. at 1052.
64. Id. at 1054.
65. !d. at 1056 ("Because the District has not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim, we do
not address the question whether such a claim could excuse the District's viewpoint
discrimination.").
66. 233 F. Supp. 2d 647 (D. N.j. 2002).
67. !d. at 651. The two schools at issue were attended by students ages three to seven and ages
eight to ten respectively. !d.
68. !d. at 668.
69. !d. at 651.
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Even though some of the flyers were directed at children, the CEF
required parent permission to participate in club activities, and,
therefore, the court considered that "parents, not children, are the
relevant audience." 70
The school district's written distribution policy in Stafford was that
all distributed materials "should relate to school matters or community
activities," and had to be "directly associated with the children who are
enrolled" in the district. All materials were supposed to be approved by
the superintendent, but certain organizations, such as the Boy Scouts,
Girl Scouts, and the Four-H Club, had been granted permission by the
school board to distribute materials without review. 71
In granting a preliminary injunction for the CEF, the court in
Stafford held that the limited public forum analysis applied not only to
school facilities, but also "to school personnel and communications
systems to reach students." 72 Although the court did not address the
merits of the case, it nonetheless observed that "the school district's
distribution, school-wall, and Back-to-School-Night fora [were] likely
limited public fora" 73 with the result that "it [was] likely that the school
district discriminated against the CEF based upon religious viewpoint." 74
Because the school district had permitted other groups that advertised
activities "to promote character building and moral and social
development," 75 the district could not prohibit expression by the CEF,
even though its speech involved "bible instruction or 'quintessentially
religious programs."' 76
Concerning the Establishment Clause, the Stafford court, like the
Supreme Court in Good News, ultimately "found unpersuasive the
argument that elementary school children would misperceive a state
endorsement of religion or feel coercive pressure to participate in
religious activities." 77 Even though the CEF material was distributed by
teachers to students while they were still in school, the court found that
the limited public forum analysis applied because the distribution did not
occur during the "instructional component of the school day." 78 Similar
to the Supreme Court's observation in Good News, the Stafford court

70. I d. at 651 n. 2.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 656 n. 7.
73. I d. at 659.
74. Id. at 660.
75. Id.
71.
72.

76. Id. (quoting Good News, 533 U.S. at !08).
77. Stafford, 233 F. Supp. at 663-65.
78.

I d. at 664.
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refused to find endorsement of religion where "[i]t is the parents who
choose whether their children will attend." 79 Finally, the court followed
the lead of Good News by rejecting a modified Heckler's Veto argument
that "a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what
the youngest members of the audience might misperceive." 80
The district court in Stafford, similar to the Ninth Circuit in Hills,
also found that the school district lacked a defense under the
Establishment Clause to justify its refusal to permit distribution of
religious materials. 81 Without such an Establishment Clause defense, the
Stafford court had no basis for considering whether a compelling interest
existed to justify the school district's decision and whether that
compelling interest was sufficient to trump the CEF's free speech claim.
The federal courts in Bronx II, Hills, and Stafford have taken their
lead from the Supreme Court in Good News in avoiding a direct
confrontation between the Free Speech and the Establishment Clauses.
The prominence of free speech analysis is evident even where a religious
claim is denied. For example, in Stafford, in addition to the school walls
and Back-to-School tables, the school district also had three bulletin
boards designated for use by the PTA, the teacher's union (STEA), and
area hospitals to which the CEF wanted access to post its materials. In
upholding the school's refusal to permit the CEF access to the bulletin
boards, the court used forum analysis and reasoned that the CEF was
"not akin to the PTA, the STEA, or a local hospital" 82 and, thus, the
district had a "legitimate interest in preserving the property for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated." 83 In other words, the school's designated
forum for these three groups did not involve moral and character
development and, thus, were closed to the CEF without the court having
to consider whether providing access to the bulletin board would have
violated the Establishment Clause.
This designated forum approach is supported by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in a non-religion-related decision, Goulart v.
Meadows, 84 where the court upheld a County Board of Commissioners'
"Use Policy" that restricted use of its community centers for recreational
and community activities but not "activities associated with meeting the
79. Id.
80. Jd. (quoting Good News, 533 U.S. at 119).
81. Stafford, 233 F. Supp. at 665.
82. !d. at 661.
83. /d. (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (I 983))
(upholding denial of access by a non-bargaining union to interschool mail use of faculty boxes where
a union contract had granted exclusive use to the bargaining union, using a designated t(mun
theory).
84. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F. 3d 239 (4th Cir. 2003).
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State requirements for elementary or secondary education." 85 Over a
facial challenge to the board's "Use Policy" by home schooling groups
who were excluded from using the centers for teaching courses to home
schooled students for state educational credit, the Fourth Circuit held
that "[i]t is reasonable for the Board to limit use of the community
centers to recreational and community enrichment activities, and formal
private education is not a use that is consistent with those purposes." 8"
Pursuant to its understanding of Good News, the court in Goulart found
no free speech violation because the plaintiffs offered no evidence that
their proposed private home schooling instruction "contained a
particular or unique viewpoint ... in any ... area that they might wish to
offer classes."H 7 Consistent then with the result in the preceding
paragraph concerning the three bulletin boards in Stafford, Goulart
found that "the government may limit a designated or limited public
forum to certain purposes, and exclude topics of speech or classes of
speakers that are inconsistent with that purpose." 88
Stafford, unlike Goulart, involved a religious viewpoint; but even if
religious viewpoints are at issue, not every federal court may choose to
ignore the Establishment Clause as a limitation on such viewpoints. In
Rusk v. Crestview Local Schools,H 9 a school board had a policy permitting
distribution of non-profit community group flyers, including religious
flyers, at the end of the school day, as long as they publicized activities
and did not promote the benefits of religion. 90 At issue in Rusk were
non-proselytizing flyers advertising "events at Christian churches that
[featured] religious activities such as Christian fellowship, Bible stories,
and 'songs that celebrate[d] God's love."' 91 The school board's policy
required the principal to review all materials to make certain they came

H5. Id. at 242. The entire "Use Policy," as pertaining to private education contained the
t(>llowing prohibited uses:
d) Instructional, educational and related enrichment activities of the type usually offered in the
public schools to children of school age, including activities in English language arts (such as
reading, writing, and spelling), mathematics, science, social studies, art, music, health and
physical education are prohibited, it being intended that the community centers not be used for
such activities associated with meeting the State requirements for elementary or secondary
education. This prohibition does not apply to activities conducted by any agency of the Calvert
County Government, the Calvert County Public Library or the Calvert County Board of
Education.

ld. at 242. n. 2.
86.

ld. at 242.

87. I d. at 257.

Id. at 259.
Rusk, 220 !'. Supp. 2d at 854.
90. I d. at 855.
9 I. I d. at 855-56.
88.

89.
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from non-profit organizations, and then to pass them on to teachers for
placement in students' homeroom mailboxes for retrieval at the end of
the school day. 92 Although the court found the school board's policy
"relatively neutral," 93 it invoked the Lemon v. Kurtzman 94 tripartite test to
find that the policy advanced religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 95 The court found that, because proselytization occurred at
events advertised in the flyers,% the non-proselytizing nature of the flyers
did not keep their distribution from violating the Establishment Clause. 97
Despite what appeared to be the Establishment Clause trumping the
religious organization's right of access to the school to distribute its
flyers, the court wavered in the end and reasserted the preeminence of
Good News' viewpoint discrimination and free speech right of access.
"Forbidding religious organizations from advertising activities at which
proselytization will occur in an elementary school does not equate to
denying access to an organization based on its viewpoint." 98
For school districts affected by Rusk (the northern district of Ohio),
the difficult task has become determining whether religious
organizations have any right of access at all to distribute flyers. 99
Religious organizations that have as part of their mission the impartation
92. Id. at 855.
93. Id. at 859.
94. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). With Rusk"s resurrection of the Lemon test, one
is reminded of justice Scalia's satiric comment in Lamb's Chapel:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center
Moriches Union Free School District.
Id. at 398 (Scalia,)., concurring).
95. Rusk, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 856-59. The three prongs of the Lemon tests are: "whether a
statute, practice, or policy (1) has a legitimate secular purpose; (2) has a primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion; and (3) fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion."
Id. at 856 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
96. See Rusk, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 860 ("[t]he flyers that Steve Rusk has submitted urge
attendance at events that clearly involve an element of proselytizing .... Given the religious
overtones of the activity, the age of the target audience and the heightened possibility that due to
their youth the children may not appreciate the neutral stance that the school claims to take with
regard to these activities, the practice of distributing these materials to elementary school students
fails to pass the endorsement test."). The only evidence presented to this effect were two flyers
"advertis[ing] events at Christian churches that feature[d] religious activities such as Christian
fellowship, Bible stories, and 'songs that celebrate God's love."' Id. at 855-56.
97. Id. at 859-60.
98. Id. at 860.
99. The school district's confusion is reflected in Rusk v. Crestview Local Sch. Dist., 2002 WI.
31506166 (N.D. Ohio 2002). In that case, Crestview Local School District sought claritlcation as to
what religious materials might be permissible under the judge's injunction. Ultimately, the judge
rather obtusely determined that nothing was confusing in his order and, if it were, the school could
submit flyers to the court on an ad hoc basis for a decision as to their appropriateness.
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of their religion-based values to young persons attending their events
would seem to be foreclosed by the Establishment Cause from access to
the public school forum. Whether the Rusk court has found a method of
prohibiting religious access under the Establishment Clause, while
maintaining the facade of free speech right of access and viewpoint
discrimination, remains to be seen. 100
Using the same Lemon test as the Rusk court, another federal district
court in the Sixth Circuit, in Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter School
Academy, 101 refused to invalidate a school practice permitting
distribution of religious materials to elementary students in their "Friday
folders" which students took home with them at the end of the day. 102
The court in Daugherty found the school's policy of "allow[ing]
community groups to distribute information that may be relevant to the
students and parents regarding community activities and events" 103 to be
neutral under the Establishment Clause. 104 In reaching this conclusion,
the court in Daugherty saw the balance between the Establishment Clause
and free speech in a way quite different from Rusk. Daugherty relied on a
Fourth Circuit decision, Peck v. Upshur County Board of Education, 105
where the Peck court had reasoned that,
to require the [School] Board to exclude religious literature as such
from the forum it has created to further the schools' educational
mission by exposing the county's students to a variety of age
appropriate private speech would evince the hostility toward religious
speech that the Establishment Clause does not require and that the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses forbid. 106
Daugherty, like Bronx II, Hills, and Stafford, avoided a direct
confrontation between Free Speech and the Establishment Clauses,
preferring instead to find no viable Establishment Clause claim. 107 Rusk
notwithstanding, the access arguments of community religious
organizations have prevailed primarily because treating these
organizations differently from others would evidence viewpoint
discrimination prohibited by the Free Speech Clause. In the absence of
100. The Rusk court's aversion to anything religious is reflected in its comment that
"advertisements promoting a food drive sponsored by a local church or temple to benefit the poor of
the community, or even a youth sports league ... would pass the constitutionality tests as I interpret
them." Rusk, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
101. Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Academy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 897 (W.O. Mich. 2000).
102. Jd.at911-12.
103. Id. at 911.
104. Id. at 911-12.
105. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. ofEduc., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998).
106. Daugherty, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 911, quoting Peck, 155 F.3d at 284.
107. Daugherty, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 911-12.
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preferential treatment for religious community organizations, 10 x courts
seem disposed to let a kind of evenhandedness prevail in free speech
access cases. 109
V. STUDENT ACCESS TO SCHOOL FACILITIES

Student religious access issues in public schools provide a greater
stress on the relationship between the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses, primarily because the issue involves students interacting with
other students during the school day, when state compulsory attendance
laws require them to be in school. 110 If students can conduct religious
meetings or distribute religious literature during the school day, when
students are required to be at school, the circuit breaker defense used in
Hills and Stafford, namely that the materials are really being sent home at
the end of the school day for the parents, does not work. Not only might
parents be unaware that their children are receiving and reading religious
literature at school in this situation, but they might also be oblivious that
their children are attending religious meetings. To the extent, then, that
students interacting with other students on religious issues in the
relatively closed school environment invokes concerns about peer
pressure to change religious views, what constraints, if any, should courts
impose on student religious access issues?
Perhaps surprisingly, courts have been fairly protective of student
religious access. With its decision in Prince v. facoby, 111 the Ninth Circuit
has taken the lead in this area, as it had with community organizations in
Hills, by protecting students' right of religious access at school under the

108. See e.g. id. at 911 ("If [the school board] manipulated the facially neutral policy so as to
give preferential access to religious literature or certain religious literature, then an Establishment
Clause violation might be made out.") (quoting Daugherty, 116 F.3d at 284); Santa Fe lndep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (Although not a community organization case, the Santa Fe court
invalidated a school policy permitting students to vote on whether to have a prayer before football
games, except where the past history of the school district had included considerable identification
with religion including having a school chaplain.).
109. The concept of evenhandedness as a definition of neutrality has arisen in government aid
to religion cases, where it has not received wide acceptance among members of the Supreme Court.
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838-40 (2000) (O'Connor, j., concurring) (disputing the concept
as defining neutrality); id. at 876-77 (Souter, j., dissenting). Notwithstanding, evenhandedness has
more affinity with free speech, where viewpoint discrimination is already embedded in the
understanding of neutrality.
110. See Ill. ex rei. McCollum v. Bd. ofEduc. ofSch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.S.
203 (1948). In striking down the district's permitting clergy to hold religious meetings on school
premises during the school day, the Court found relevant that "[t]he operation of the state's
compulsory education system ... assist[ed] and [was] integrated with the program of religious
instruction carried on by separate religious sects." Id. at 209.
111. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1074.
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Free Speech Clause. In Prince, the court addressed a high school
student's claim that her school district's refusal to recognize World
Changers, a religious club to which she belonged, as an Associated
Student Body club (ASB), constituted a violation of the Equal Access Act
(EAA) and Free Speech Clause. 112 The high school operated a dual
student group recognition system, Associated Student Body and Policy
5225 (Policy). Recognition as an ASB club brought a significant number
of benefits to its members. ASB groups, for example, shared funds from
the sale of ASB cards, and were permitted to sell crafts at the school's
craft fair, to participate in the ASB auction, and to engage in other
fundraisers. In addition, ASB groups could meet during student/staff
time during the school day (10:10-10:40 a.m.), where attendance was
taken, had access to school supplies, audio/visual equipment, and the PA
system, were given free inclusion of the club's picture in the yearbook,
and were permitted to use school vehicles. 113 Policy groups, on the other
hand, received none of the above benefits and could meet only if they
satisfied rules requiring that their meetings: (1) be voluntary and studentinitiated; (2) not be sponsored by the school or its staff; (3) be held at
times that did not interfere with the school; (4) be the responsibility
solely of students for conduct; (5) have student participation that was
voluntary; (6) not use school funds; (7) not compel staff to attend; and,
(8) respect the constitutional rights of all students. 114
The Ninth Circuit decided that the school district, in denying World
Changers' ASB recognition and benefits, did not violate the EAA because
the meetings would not occur during non- instructional time. 115
However, denying World Changers' ASB recognition and benefits did
violate the Free Speech Clause. The court reasoned that the student/staff
meeting time and the provision of school supplies and equipment were
required under the Free Speech Clause because the district had created
a limited public forum in which student groups [were] free to meet
during student/staff time, as well as to use school vehicles for field trips,
to have priority for use of the AV equipment, and to use school supplies

I d. at I 077.
/d. at 1078.
/d. at 1077. The EEA, contains similar language in its definition of "fair opportunity
20 U.S.C:. § 4071(c).
115. The court determined that EAA did not apply to the student/staff meeting time; since it
occurred during the school day and attendance was taken, it did not qualify as "noninstructional
time." Prince, 303 F.3d at 1087-89; 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b). Regarding participation in the craft fair,
school auction, fund raising, and free appearance in the yearbook, the court held that EAA was not
applicable because the funding carne from the sale of ASB cards, not school district funds. Prince,
303 !'.3d at tORS.
112.
113.
114.
criteria."

286

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2004

such as markers, posterboard, and paper. 116

Providing these services to World Changers would not violate the
Establishment Clause because providing the services would be done on "a
neutral basis [that] ... is secular in content," essentially meaning that all
groups would have equal access to the materials and vehicles. 117
Worth noting in Prince is the court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as requmng only neutrality, a kind of
evenhandedness "providing equal access to a 'service' that happens to be
paid for by public funds." 118 The court dispelled any notion that students
might perceive a religious club meeting during school hours as being
endorsed by the school because "the School District here can dispel any
'mistaken inference of endorsement' by making it clear to students that a
club's private speech is not the speech of the school." 119
Prince is the third Ninth Circuit decision 120 addressing religious
groups meeting on school premises and represents the farthest reach of
the Free Speech Clause yet into public schools. After Prince, at least
within the Ninth circuit, a limited public forum can exist during a period
of the school day, even if attendance is taken, as long as other student
groups are permitted to meet.
The Third Circuit, in Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School
Board, 121 reached a result similar to Prince, relying both on EAA and free
speech to require that a student religious club, FISH, have the same
opportunity to meet as secular student clubs. 122 The court in Donovan,
however, pressed the application of the EAA further than the Ninth
Circuit had been willing to do in Prince. While the Ninth Circuit had
116. Prince, 3031:'.3d. at 1091.
117. Id. at 1094.
118. Id. The Prince Court looked to Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 794 (2000), for support. Prince,
303 F.3d at 1093-1094. In Mitchell, the Court upheld the loan of supplies and materials to religious
schools as long as they were neutral, that is, secular in content. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835-36.
119. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1094, (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251). In Mergens, the Court had
declared more broadly that:
[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.
496 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
120. The first two decisions were Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1993), where the court held that the EAA applied to a religious groups meeting before school at a
time when other groups could meet, and Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of San Diego Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d
878 (9th Cir. 1997), where the court held that EAA applied to lunch where no classroom instruction
occurred and the school operated an open campus during lunchtime.
121. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 214.
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found the EAA inapplicable to a staff/student meeting period during the
school day, the Third Circuit held that a half-hour activity period at the
beginning of the school day constituted "non-instructional time" for
purposes of EAA.
The Donovan court reasoned that, even though attendance was taken
during the activity period (as had been the case in Prince), academic
instruction did not begin at the school until 8:54 a.m. when the activity
period ended. Using a picturesque metaphor, the Third Circuit quaintly
observed that "[j]ust as putting a 'Horse' sign around a cow's neck does
not make a bovine equine, a school's decision that a free-wheeling
activity period constitutes actual classroom instructional time does not
make it so." 123 Invoking the Supremacy Clause, 124 the Third Circuit
ignored the school district's argument that the half-hour was used in
calculating the state minimum number of hours by declaring that state
law cannot frustrate rights under federal law. 125 In ruling against the
school district on viewpoint discrimination grounds, the court held that
"FISH ... discusse[d] current issues from a biblical perspective and [that]
school officials [had] denied the club equal access to meet on school
premises during the activity period solely because of the club's religious
nature." 126
However, like the Good News, Bronx II, Hills, and Stafford courts
before it, the Third Circuit in Donovan also refused to address whether
an Establishment Clause violation might constitute a sufficiently
compelling interest to overcome free speech protection. 127 As in the
other cases, Donovan sidestepped a confrontation between the Free
Speech and Establishment clauses because, citing to Good News,
"allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality,
not threaten it." 128 Again, the court categorized neutrality as a kind of
evenhandedness where the plaintiff in Donovan "merely [sought] an
equal opportunity to express herself along with other like-minded
students." 129
Access issues for students include not only meeting times, but
distribution of religious materials as well. A federal district court, in

123.

Id. at 224.

124. U.S. Con st., Art VI, § 2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
125.

Donovan, 336 l'.3d at 224.

126. /d. at 226.
127. /d. (refusing to "confront this thorny issue" because the court determined that the school
district had no valid Establishment Clause issue).
128. /d. (quoting Good News, 533 U.S. at 114).

129. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 227.
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Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield,uo reached much
the same result on the free speech issue of the distribution of candy canes
with a religious message as did Donovan for meeting time for religious
clubs. In Westfield, a school district superintendent had created a policy
prohibiting the distribution of "non-school curriculum or activity related
literature of any kind directly to other students on school grounds." 131
The school district's written policy also required that all materials to be
distributed had to be approved in advance by the principal. 132
Pursuant to this policy, members of a religious club (L.I.F.E.)
presented a candy cane with an attached religious message for review by
the high school principal. The message contained information about the
religious club, 133 the text of a Bible verse, 134 an explanation of the religious
significance of the red and white colors of the candy cane, 135 and an
exhortation that "it is trusting Jesus Christ that saves you." 136 When the
principal in Westfield read the religious message he prohibited its
distribution because he found it to be "offensive." 137 Despite the religious
club members not having permission to distribute the candy canes, they
did so anyway and were penalized with a one-day, in-school
suspension. 13H However, the suspensions were stayed pending parent
appeal and were never served by the students. 139
A federal district court, relying on free speech analysis, enjoined
Westfield High School from enforcing its "non-curriculum related
literature" policy, from enforcing any penalty on the students, from
imposing a prior restraint on distributing literature with a religious
message, and from prohibiting students' distribution of religious
literature during non-instructional time or penalizing students who did
so. 140
Using the strongest language possible, the court laid the
responsibility for compliance with the free speech rights with the
principal. When the principal defended his denying permission for
130. Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
131. Id. at 104.
132. Id. at 103.
133. ld. at 104 (the meeting day, time and place for the religious club).
134. Id. at 105 ("And this is my prayer: that your love may abound more and knowledge and
depth of insight, so that you may be able to discern what is best and may be pure and blameless until
the day of Christ, filled with the fruits of righteousness that comes through Jesus Christ-to the glory
and praise of God." Philippians 1: 9-11.).
135. !d. (The white represents the purity of jesus and the red represents the blood that he shed
on the cross.).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 106.
139. ld. at 107.
140. Id. at 129.
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distribution of the religious messages because he did not understand that
the students wanted only to distribute them during non-instructional
time, the court responded with a stinging rebuke:
A students' free speech rights should not hinge upon how he or she
words the question ('Can I pass out candy canes?' versus 'Can I pass out
candy canes during non-instructional time in a manner that will not
cause any disruption or disorder within the school?'), especially when it
is the school administrator who is more likely to possess a working
knowledge of school policies and the law. 141

Although the Westfield court, in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, never reached the merits of the case, the court's
free speech analysis strongly suggests that plaintiffs would have prevailed
on the merits. In the court's hierarchy of speech in school settings, the
greatest degree of school control includes, at one end, "unfettered control
over content" by school officials "of government speech (i.e., a principal
speaking at a school assembly)," followed by "school sponsored speech
(i.e., a teacher editing a curriculum-based newspaper that is a part of a
journalism class)." 142 At the other end, however, is "private, schooltolerated speech (i.e., student speaking to another during lunch break)"
which can be controlled by the school only "to the extent [that] it
substantially disrupts or materially interferes with the school's
disciplinary concerns." 143
The court turned to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District 144 to determine whether the student's distribution of candy
canes with their religious messages had been disruptive. 145 In Tinker, the
Supreme Court had declared that restricting student speech in a school
setting required
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint .... [It
required a] finding ... that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.' 146
The Westfield court pointedly observed that,
[t] here is nothing in the evidence before the Court to suggest that other
students were not free to decline the candy canes, that the student

Id. at 112.
Id. at 114 n. 13.
143. Id.
144. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 ( 1969).
145. Westjield, 249 r. Supp. 2d at 109.

141.

142.

146.

ld. at 509.
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plaintiffs coerced others into accept [sic] their message, that the student
plaintiffs invaded the rights of others not to receive literature by, for
example, stuffing lockers, or that the student plaintiffs blocked other
students from entering class, actions which could constitute even
substantial interference and justify restricting distribution to a more
reasonable time, manner, and place. 147

In a sweeping indictment of the manner in which the school
principal had handled the religious club's distribution of the candy canes,
the court held that the plaintiffs constitutional rights were protected
from the moment that she "walked onto the grounds of Westfield High
School ... [to share] candy canes and religious messages with her fellow
students.... " 148 The school principal, in order to prove disruption under
Tinker, had a higher standard to meet than his own personal offense to
the religious message. 149
The school district had further argued in Westfield, as almost a dying
gasp, that the religious club was school-sponsored, and, as such, the
district could control it under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 150
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court found a principal's removal of two
pages from a school newspaper, which had been prepared as part of a
journalism class, to be constitutional, and upheld "educators' authority
over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 151 In
finding Hazelwood inapposite, the Westfield court observed that although
"[a]ny student group meeting on school premises may arguably be
characterized as school-sponsored 152 ••• [r]ather, for expressive activity
to be school-sponsored, the school needs to take affirmative steps in
promoting the particular speech." 153
As the court observed in Westfield, the very distance that the high
school had maintained between itself and the L.I.F.E. club, so as not to
offend the Establishment Clause, assured that the school could never be
considered as sponsoring the club for purposes of Hazelwood.

147. Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
148. Id. at 114 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
149. See Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 116. (In paraphrasing Tinker, the Westfield court
observed that "a school's unsubstantiated apprehension of disruption is insufficient justification for
suppressing students' rights to free speech .... ").
150. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that a school needed only
a reasonable basis for deleting material from a school newspaper prepared as part of a curriculumrelated activity).
151. Id. at 271.
152. Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
153. Id. at 117.
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The school does not fund the Club; the Club's activities are not directly
related to any subject taught in any course that the school offers; the
school does not require any student to participate in the group; the
school does not give club members academic credit for participation in
the L.I.F.E. Club. 154
As with the other cases discussed in this article, the court in Westfield
did not have to address a conflict between Free Speech and the
Establishment Clause.
As the court observed, "the candy cane
distributions [were] expressive activities" and, without any support for
the school's sponsorship argument that "it [was] affirmatively promoting
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause," 155 the religious club's
free speech claim prevailed because the school district had no viable
Establishment Clause argument. 156
Westfield raised the question about student club access/distribution
during non-instructional time during the school day, particularly during
the parts of the school day spent outside of the classroom. Still
unanswered, however, is what free speech rights, if any, would (or,
should) students have if distribution is to occur in the classroom?
The Third Circuit, in Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township
Board of Education, 157 addressed an issue similar to Westfield. In W alz,
the court dealt with an elementary student's alleged free speech right to
distribute candy canes with religious messages 15 R during classroom
parties. 159 In Walz, a parent of a pre-kindergarten student, in response to
a Parent Teacher Organization request for "candy, pencils, whatever" for
distribution to other students responded by sending pencils containing
the message, '"Jesus [Loves] The Little Children' (heart symbol)." 160 The
school district superintendent refused to permit the pencils to be
distributed because the students' "parents might perceive the message as
being endorsed by the school." 161 Six months later, the district's board of
education adopted a policy that provided, in part, that "no religious belief
or non-belief shall be promoted in the regular curriculum or in districtsponsored courses, programs or activities, and none shall be

154. Id. alliS. Cf Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-63,268-69.
155. Westjield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
156. The Westfield court did observe, however, that had the religious club's speech been
school-tolerated, it "would likely violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 113.
157. Walz, 342 F.3d at 271.
158. The messages attached to the candy canes varied from "Jesus Loves the Little Children" to
a longer religious story incorporating the red and white colors of the candy cane as "symbols for the
birth, ministry, and death of)esus Christ." !d. at 273-74.
159. Id.at273-75
160. Id at 273.
161. !d.
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disparaged." 162 At Christmastime shortly thereafter, when the student
was a kindergartner, the parent sent candy canes with an attached
message, virtually identical to that in Westfield, about the religious
significance of the red and white colors. The student handed these to his
classmates in the hallway, apparently without incident. A year later,
when the student was a first-grader, he was prohibited from handing out
similar candy canes at a classroom party, but was permitted by school
officials "to distribute the candy canes in the hallway outside the
classroom, at recess, or after school as students were boarding buses." 163
At this point, the student, through his parent, tlled suit against the
school district alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. 104 The
Third Circuit, in upholding summary judgment for the school district,
relied on the same Hazelwood decision that the Westfield court had
considered inapposite to its set of facts. Citing to Hazelwood, the W alz
court held that
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 165

In Walz, the school's curricular purpose, "to teach social skills and
respect for others in a festive setting," 166 prevailed over the individual
student's candy cane distribution. As the court noted, "[t]here is a
marked difference between expression that symbolizes individual
religious observance, such as wearing a cross on a necklace, and
expression that proselytizes a particular view." 167
The student's allegation of "hostility toward religion," 16 H an allegation
that had carried the day in Daugherty, went nowhere in W alz. The court
found, instead, that where classroom activities with clearly defined
curricular purposes are at issue, neutrality has another side. In this case,
the school district was neutral toward religion because it "prohibit[ ed] all
endorsements of specific messages, including those with commercial,
political, or religious undertones." 169 In other words, "by bringing gifts
that promoted a specific religious message," 170 the student was treated no

162.

Id.

163. Id. at 274.
164. Id.
165.

Id. at 280-81 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).

166.

Walz, 342 F.3d at 279.

167. Id. at 278-79.
168. I d. at 279 n. 6.
169. Id.
170.

I d. at 280.
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differently than would a student, presumably, who sought to hand out
bumper stickers for a political candidate.
Unquestionably, the result in Walz was influenced by the age of the
students. As the Third Circuit observed:
[I]n an elementary school classroom, the line between school-endorsed
speech and merely allowable speech is blurred, not only for the young,
impressionable students but also for their parents who trust the school
to confine organized activities to legitimate and pedagogically-based
goals. 171
Nonetheless, although the student in Walz lost in his free speech
claim, the court made two significant comments regarding free speech in
elementary schools that are worth noting. First, while the school
permitted the student to distribute the candy canes in the school hallway
after class and at recess, the court observed that "[t]his accommodation
seems more than reasonable and perhaps even unnecessary." 172 Second,
the court observed that, in an elementary classroom setting, "[i]ndividual
student expression that articulates a particular view but that comes in
response to a class assignment or activity would appear to be
protected." 17 ' The court went on to note, consistent with Tinker, that
"individual student expression that is or is likely to be disruptive may be
properly restricted." 174
Although these two comments are dicta, they provide grist for the
free speech mill. What implications might they have for future litigation?
In the first comment, it is unclear what the court meant by its
observation that a school may not need to accommodate an elementary
student's request to hand out religious materials in other-than-classroom
Is accommodation
settings because it would be "unnecessary."
unnecessary because elementary students are involved and elementary
students are more impressionable, 175 or is the accommodation
unnecessary only because the school has not created a limited public
forum? While the Third Circuit observed that kindergarten and first

171.
172.
173.
174.

I d. at 277.
/d. at 280.
Id. at 279.
I d.

175. Courts lend to be protective of elementary students because of their impressionability. See
e.g. Wallace v. fa[free, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (rejecting a state law authorizing a period of silence for
voluntary prayer in a matter that involved a kindergarten student); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 ("[A]
school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in
determining whether to disseminate student speech in potentially sensitive topics, which might
range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage
sexual activity in a high school setting.").
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grade "children are most impressionable," 171i one can argue that control
over school curriculum by school officials should be limited only to the
classroom. 177 Thus, Walz leaves open the possibility that, even in an
elementary school, a limited public forum could be created for nonclassroom areas, allowing distribution of religious material as long as
school officials have permitted students to distribute non-religious
materials in those areas.
The second comment regarding student expressive rights attendant
to "a class assignment or activity" is more problematic. If the court is
suggesting that students have some measure of free speech rights to
religious expression with regard to class assignments or activities, that
would be a dramatic turn of events. Whether the Third Circuit intended
to create such a right might be doubtful in light of its earlier decision in
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva 178 where an en bane court found no school
board liability for an alleged free speech violation when an elementary
student's religious artwqrk from a class assignment was taken from its
original location in the school hallway and hung in a less visible place. 179
Other courts have found that free speech does not extend into the
classroom either because school boards have considerable control over
curriculum under Hazelwood 180 or because classrooms are non-public
fora. 181 However, one must note that a vigorous dissent in the evenly
divided C.H. case would have permitted the student to go to trial on the
issue of viewpoint discrimination because
public school students have the right to express religious views in class
discussion or in assigned work, provided that their expression falls
within the scope of the discussion or the assignment and provided that

176. Walz, 342 F.3d at 277. "As a general matter, the elementary school classroom, ~.speciall)'
for kindergartners and first graders, is not a place for student advocacy. To requirl' a school lo
permit the promotion of a specific message would infringe upon a school's kgitim.tk .1rea of
control." !d.
177. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277.
178. C.H. ex rei. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en bane).
179. !d. at 200. C.H. represented an evenly divided Third Circuit where the opinion of the
court was based on a finding of no liability because no evidence of a custom or practice of violating
religious free speech had been presented, while the dissent found evidence of viewpoint
discrimination. Id.
180. See e.g. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1'•·l5) (upholding teacher\
refusal for student to write a biography on jesus Christ, even though the teacher made both errors of
fact and law regarding religion).
181. See Muller v. jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996); Miles v. /)cnvcr Pu/1.
Schs., 944 f.2d 733 (lOth Cir. 1991); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. H.lH IW D. l'a.
[996).
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the school's restriction on expression does not satisfy strict scrutiny. 1R2

Because of the ambiguity of the Walz court's language, one will have
to await further litigation to see whether the Third Circuit intends to
move in the direction of adopting the C. H. court's dissenting views and
introduce some measure of free speech into the classroom.
The tension between a student's interest in free speech, unfettered by
viewpoint discrimination, and a school's interest in controlling its
educational mission under Hazelwood came to a head in a recent
Michigan federal district court decision, Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public
Schools. 1K' Hansen presents a different kind of access issue, namely the
right of a student to present an unpopular religious point of view. In
Hansen, as part of diversity week, a school permitted the school's
Gay/Straight Alliance to organize a panel on Homosexuality and Religion
that included local clergy with views favorable to homosexuality. 184
Although school officials had initially opened up participation on the
panel to students, it ended up denying the request of a student member
(plaintiff-Hansen) of a religious club, Pioneers for Christ, to be a member
of the panel because of her views against homosexuality. A school
principal later offered the student an opportunity to give a speech at an
assembly on the topic, "What Diversity Means to Me," but, after
submitting her speech to a principal, she was required by school officials
to delete comments as to why she thought that homosexuality was
wrong. Plaintiff filed suit against the school district and school officials
under a number of legal theories, the most important being violations of
Free Speech and the Establishment Clause. In granting the plaintiff
injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief for violation of her
rights under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, the court
observed that school officials had
censored Betsy's speech, finding objectionable that portion of her
speech in which she expressed that she could not accept sexual
orientation or religious teachings that she believes are wrong ... [and
their denial of her] representation on the Homosexuality and Religion
panel was similarly motivated by their disagreement with [plaintiff]
Betsy's viewpoint. 185
Defendants' efforts to characterize the panel and assembly as

JH2. C:./1, 226 !'.3d at 210 (Alito & Mansmann, ))., dissenting). An example of school's
compelling interest to restrict speech that would satisfy strict scrutiny would be "material and
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline ... such as one espousing racial hatred." I d. at
212.
UD.

/lanscn v. Ann Arbor Puh. Schs., 293 1'. Supp. 2d 780 (E. D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2003).

I X4.

ld. at 7R5.

I H5.

!d. at ROO.
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government speech under Hazelwood failed, for, as the court noted, "not
a single school administrator or teacher conveyed any viewpoint or
message at either forum." 186 The school district's other Hazelwood claim
that it was furthering "pedagogical objectives" in "making students aware
of minority points of view, creating a safe and supportive environment
for gay and lesbian students" 187 was roundly rejected by the court. As the
court observed, "it [was] not educational theory or practice that [school
district] Defendants rel[ied] upon, but rather it [was] their specific
disapproval of the message that [plaintiff] would have conveyed that
underlies their decision." 188 In response to the school district's claim that
they were advancing the goal of "acceptance and tolerance for minority
points of view," the court's stinging response was that "their
demonstrated intolerance for a viewpoint that was not consistent with
their own is hardly worthy of serious comment." 189
The connection between Hazelwood and free speech is the most
instructive part of the decision. Hansen is the first federal court to hold
that, even though "Hazelwood itself does not specifically mention
viewpoint neutrality, it is implicit in the Court's holding." 1911 Thus,
school officials cannot cavalierly engage in viewpoint discrimination
under the guise of controlling the school's educational environment. As
the court pointedly noted, "Defendants fail[ed] to show why gays would
be threatened or be made less 'safe' by allowing the expression of an
opposing viewpoint, particularly when the panel included six clerics
presenting the opposite view." 191
Finally, the court invoked the same Lemon tripartite test that the
Rusk court used to prohibit distribution of community organization
religious material. In this case, however, the court found that the practice
violated the Establishment Clause. In addition to the panel, with its
clerics failing the first part of the test by having a non -secular purpose

and failing the second part of the test by having a preference for "a
particular religious view," 192 the court opined that the
Defendants' level of involvement in this case in selecting the clergy for
186. Id. at 794.
187. ld. at 797.
188. Id. at 800.
189. ld at 801-02. (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 798.
191. Id. at 802.
192. Jd. at 805. For the three parts of the Lemon test, see supra, n.95.
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the panel, vetting the religious beliefs of the chosen clergy, recruiting
the clergy, and providing school facilities and a captive audience of
students for the clergy, and censoring and editing Betsy Hansen's
speech based on its religious viewpoint, constitutes the kind of
'excessive entanglement with religion' found by the Supreme Court to
be constitutionally impermissible. 193

Hansen provides balance to W alz by confirming that the concept of
neutrality, in the sense of evenhandedness, does have a place in free
speech. While school districts have considerable authority in controlling
their educational mission, they cannot create a limited public forum that
only permits religious views favorable to them. Clearly, school officials
in Hansen could have maintained control over diversity week and
presented their views of diversity, 194 but once they opened the forum to
outside religious speakers and other students, they crossed from
Hazelwood to free speech viewpoint discrimination. At that point, they
violated not only the Free Speech Clause, but the Establishment Clause as
well.

VI. CONCLUSION
Community groups and individual students/student groups have
convergent, yet separable, free speech issues regarding access to public
schools. Whether the resistance of some public schools to religious
expression belies an attitude that "bristles with hostility to all things
religious" 195 may never be clear. What is more important, though, is that
the free speech rights forged by the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel and
Good News have served to level the playing field for religious claimants.
By merging the Free Speech Clause's concept of the limited public
forum with the Establishment Clause's concept of neutrality, federal
courts have infused free expression with the notion of evenhandedness.
Access by religious claimants to public schools can still be restricted, and
in some cases even prohibited, but the rules for governing access will now
be defined under Free Speech, not under the misplaced Establishment
Clause aphorism of a "wall of separation of church and state." 196
193. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
194. See Downs v. LA. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a school
could rdi.1se to permit an individual teacher to post anti-homosexuality materials in response to the
Los Angeles Unified School District's "Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month" posters and materials
which were provided by the central office to schools within the district and posted on a school
bulletin board which, pursuant to actual practice and policy, was under the direct control and
oversight of the school principal).
195. Santa Fe Tndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, C)., dissenting).
196. See J;Cnerally Daniel Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow: Religious Liberty and the
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Religious expression, as any other kind of expression, can be
restricted and even prohibited if it becomes disruptive to the school
environment, but only to the extent that the alleged disruption is,
pursuant to Tinker, material and substantial and not the product of a
school official's personal opinion. In addition, school districts are free to
make educational choices about the district's mission and curriculum,
but these choices, if Hazelwood is to apply, must be those of the school
board and school officials. Once school officials look beyond the school
and have the school district's choices championed by persons outside the
school or by students selected for their points of view, the school runs the
risk of violating free speech.
Religious groups afford unique challenges for school boards because
such groups invariably have a viewpoint to present. To the extent that
school districts want to prevent access by religious community groups to
their schools, their options are somewhat limited. They can choose to
prohibit all community groups from their schools, with whatever public
relations impact that decision might have in the community. School
boards also have the option, as boards did in Stafford and Goulart, of
designating the uses of the forum; but as Good News and Bronx II
suggest, boards cannot prohibit all religious uses while permitting nonreligious ones. What remains, then, is the delicate dance between
viewpoint discrimination, which is prohibited, and subject matter
exclusions, which arguably may still be permissible under Good News.
Similarly, if school districts want to ban religious student
organizations from their schools, they can close their schools under EAA
to all but student organizations that are curriculum-related. Such a
decision might not be popular with parents and students, but it invokes
no free speech rights for non-curriculum-related groups. However, once
a school permits a non-curriculum-related student group to meet on
school premises, a cognizable argument can be made that the creation of
a limited open forum under EAA automatically invokes a limited public
forum under free speech. Once a school has passed over to a limited
public forum, the school arguably has lost the force of Hazelwood to
control the educational process, and is essentially left with only the
disruptive restrictions from Tinker to limit the expression of religious
content.
The expressive rights of individual students are more complicated by
the limited public forum difference between classrooms and nonclassroom areas. However, even here, school officials can close these
First Amendment 124-27 (The Rutherford Jnst. Rpt.: Vol. 5, Crossway Books 1987), for an effective
refutation of the view that Thomas Jefferson intended the aphorism as the definition of the
Establishment Clause to prohibit religious activity in the public sector.
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non-classroom areas to student expression, in effect eliminating these
areas as limited public fora. In the alternative, school officials can
maintain these non-classroom areas as limited public fora, subject to the
Tinker test for disruption. Free speech does not deprive school districts
of their right to control their schools, but it does assure that this control
will occur in a fair and evenhanded manner.

